Arabism and Islamism in Sayyid Quṭb's Thought on Nationalism

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I n the view of many a scholar, Egyptian Islamic and activist Sayyid Quṭb (1906–1966) is one of the most reflective thinkers and ideologues of Islamic resurgence. The phenomenon of Islamic resurgence in the Arab world has been considered as a response to the "forces of secularization" and "the crisis of the secular nation-states."[1] In the words of Ibrahim Abu-Rabiʿ "one must concede that the second important variable in the making of Islamic resurgence in the Arab world after colonialism has been nationalism. The intellectual history of Arab Islamic resurgence gains a new epistemic force during the time in which Arab nationalism is gaining political power. Sayyid Quṭb's thought is a clear representative of that."[2] In his ideological response, Sayyid Quṭb provided a modern systematic political, economic, social, intellectual and moral reading of Islam and outlined the Islamically based political theory of the Islamic nation-state.[3] In this context, the question of the relationship between Islamism and Arab nationalism has increasingly come to be one of the pressing and sensitive issues in the debate.[4] Here, Quṭb's concept of nationalism merits more attention than it has received; it could lead us to a better understanding of the tendency usually labeled "Islamic fundamentalism," which William E. Shepard would prefer to call "radical Islamism."[5] In this respect and contributing to the debate, this article intends to investigate the sociopolitical and religious basis of Quṭb's concept of nationalism and analyze the relevance of Quṭb's own constructs to the concept of nation-state, Arab nationalism, and Egyptian nationalism. The article also traces Quṭb's concept of nationalism during his personal involvement with the Free Officers in the Egyptian national movement prior to and after the Egyptian Revolution of 1952. Analysis will involve Quṭb's religio-political constructs such as *ḥakimiyyah* (sovereignty), *ʿubudiyyah* (servitude), and

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'alamiyyat al-Islam (the universality of Islam) and relate these to his philosophical ideas such as *fitrah* (the unchangeable constitution that Allah made innate to the universe, life and Man), *al-'aql* (human intellect), *al-kawn* (universe). The discussion also focuses on the sociopolitical implications of Qutb's concept of nation and community (*ummah*), and his comprehensive idea of the relationship between the Creator and the creation, the universe, life and humankind.

Qutb's concept of nationalism rests in his interrelated religio-political constructs such as *hakimiyyah* (sovereignty), *'ubudiyyah* (servitude or servanthood: complete submission to Allah alone), and *'alamiyyat al-Islam* (universality of Islam). He interweaves these interrelated concepts with his philosophical ideas of *al-'aql* (human intellect), *al-fitrah* and its connotations of original nature of the universe, life and man. How did Qutb develop his view of nationalism from these religio-political and philosophical concepts?

One should note that the word *fitrah* is a Qur'anic term derived from the Arabic root *f t r*, from which the strong triliteral verb perfect *fatara* and the nomen agantis *fatir* are derived. The root action *f t r* means to create, originate, and cleave. Accordingly, a *fatir* is one who enjoys origination (*al-ibtida'*) and creation (*al-khalq*) or brings something into being. Thus, where Arabs say "*ana fataru al-shay'*," it means "I have created the thing." The verb perfect *fatara* means he has originated or created (it). Likewise, "*fatiri al-samawati wa al-ard*" (Qur'an 35:1) means "the Originator or the Creator of the Heavens and the Earth." Thus, the term *fitrah* literally means originating or creating a thing with an unchangeable natural constitution. This meaning encompasses the universe, life and humankind. In the case of humans, *fitrah* signifies a fixed or unchangeable natural constitution, the legacy of every created being.[6]

For Qutb, as for al-Qurtubi (d. 1273), Ibn Taymiyyah (d. 1328), al-'Asqalani (d. 1449) and Muhammad 'Abduh (d. 1905), Islam is the religion of *fitrah*: every human being is born in a state of complete submission to the Creator.[7] This idea, which acclaimed the *'ubudiyyah* (servitude) of all human beings to the Creator, opened the gate wide open to Qutb's interrelated ideas. Therefore, Qutb makes a point when he links the idea of *fitrah* with *'ubudiyyah* (servitude) to emphasize that all human beings at birth are in a state of *'ubudiyyah* or complete submission (Muslim) to Allah alone. This means, to Qutb, that the identity or the nationality of all human beings at birth is Islam.[8] Then, he who affirms his *'ubudiyyah* to Allah alone thereby acknowledges the *hakimiyyah* (sovereignty)[9] and authority of Allah over everything in his life.[10] Here, the decision, as Qutb asserts, is a personal one. Islam grants human intellect (*al-'aql*), the freedom to think of religion (without compulsion of any type or form). This freedom, in Qutb's view, is limited, as there is no freedom without responsibility. As long as there is free decision,

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there is responsibility, that is every person is responsible for his decision. Therefore, when Islam grants to every human being the freedom to think, Islam coupled it with responsibility.[11] As this briefly reflects the connection between Quṭb's ideas, it also indicates that *ḥakimiyyah*, *'ubudiyyah* and the universality of Islam together with *al-'aql* and *fiṭrah* all are one integrated concept that characterizes the comprehensiveness of Quṭb's concept of nationalism.[12] To Quṭb, Islam is a universal system of life and meant for the whole world.[13] This also brings the notion of Islam as the primary identity of all human beings of different ethnicity, languages, territories and beliefs.[14] Thus, nationalism, in Quṭb's view, is not regional but 'supra-national' (*qawmiyyah al-'ulya*). In this regard, Quṭb quoted Leopold Weiss (Muḥammad Asad):

> No sign is available that mankind, in its present stature, has outgrown Islam. It has not been able to produce a better system of ethics than that expressed in Islam. It has not been able to put the idea of human brotherhood on a practical footing, as Islam did in its supra-national concept of *ummah* (*fikrat al-qawmiyyah al-'ulya: al-ummah*).[15]

Here, Quṭb linked nationalism to Islam's worldwide system of life. This type of nationalism, which meant world community, is not the secular one, which is racist and regional. Secular nationalism is by definition not universal: "The spirit of nationalism is still far stronger than the spirit of world community (Emory S. Bgardus)."[16] In Quṭb's view, secular nationalism is regional and he rejects it as *jahiliyyah*.[17] The other type of nationalism that Quṭb stands for is connected to Islam. To him, Islam is the primary identity of all human beings at birth. Those who testify that there is no god but Allah thereby affirm that their identity is Islamic. Rejecting Islam does not change its universality.

Quṭb's view of nationalism in connection with Islam, which appeared in his later writings of the 1960s, is actually rooted in his earlier writings of the 1950s. For the purpose of this study, I will briefly outline Quṭb's position.

(a). In the 1950s and within the period of about four years (after he returned to Cairo from America in August 1950 until 1954), Quṭb published two books and more than 80 articles. In February 1951, he published *Ma'rakat al-Islam wa al-Ra'smaliyyah (Islam and Capitalism)*. This was followed by *al-Salam al-'Alami wa al-Islam (Islam and Universal Peace)*, published in October 1951.[18] Some of his articles from the early 1950s were collected and published in books during his life, but some others were published posthumously. For example, from the articles published in periodicals prior to and just after the Egyptian Revolution in 1952, thirty-six articles were collected in a book entitled *Dirasat Islamiyyah (Islamic Studies)*, published in 1953.

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Similarly, Quṭb's book *Nahwa Mujtamaʿ Islami* (*Towards an Islamic Society*) was published in 1969, after Quṭb's death in 1966. This book, however, contains only some of Quṭb's articles, which were published in *al-Muslimun Juranl* in the period from 1952 to 1954.[19] In these works, Quṭb continued to focus on a distinctive Islamic society, with a watchful eye on the intellectual diversity, corruption and mounting political problems in Egypt. In this context, he emphasized nationalism from his Islamist perspective. His view of nationalism in connection to Islam begins with his idea that the homeland (*al-watan*) is an idea in the consciousness (*fikrah fi al-shuʿur*), not a geographical place. In this regard, he says:

> In the Islamic view, all human beings are one nation (*ummah wahidah*). Thus, there is no race, or homeland (*watan*) that can exploit other races or the homeland of others . . . When Islam abolishes both those geographical bounds and racism (*ʿunsuriyyah*), upon which the idea of the national homeland (*al-watan al-qawmi*) is established, it does not abolish the idea of homeland completely but preserves its righteous meaning, that is the meaning of association (*tajammuʿ*), brotherhood, cooperation, system, and the meaning of the common goal with which the group is associated. This makes the idea of homeland (*watan*) an idea in the consciousness (*fikrah fi al-shuʿur*), not a piece of land. In the shelter of this idea, the peoples of all races, colors, and territories can associate as people of one homeland (*watan wahid*). They are brothers in the name of Allah, cooperating for their welfare and the welfare of humanity as a whole. This idea is Islam — 'The true believers are brothers' [Qurʾān, 49:15] . . . Here the idea of Islam replaces the idea of homeland (*watan*) in its righteous meaning . . . What emerges from this [idea] is the feeling that every territory under the shelter of Islam is the homeland (*watan*) of all Muslims and they are all its citizens . . .[20]
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> The patriotic creed (*al-ʿaqidah al-wataniyyah*) itself is not enough, because it cannot stand in the face of the communist creed (*al-ʿaqidah al-shuyuʿiyyah*) in many countries. In social life, the idea of social justice between individuals prevailed over the slogan of patriotism in the countries where people were divided into masters and slaves. No system other than Islam is able to establish the two ideas [patriotism and social justice] altogether, without contradiction or conflict between them. Islam has the capacity to establish both ideas: the idea of patriotism (*fikrat al-wataniyyah*), in the bigger Islamic homeland (*al-watan al-Islami al-Akbar*) that exists wherever Islam extends its shade; and the idea of complete social justice in this vast homeland (*al-watan al-kabir*).'[21]
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> The way that we are calling for is the way . . . that leads to the establishment of a society with its own independent identity . . . Islam must govern . . .[22]

(b). In the 1960s, Quṭb defined the concept of *ummah* (literally: nation)[23] to serve his ideological view of nationalism in connection to Islam as follows:

> The basis for association is belief (*'aqidah*) . . . Humanity must associate on the basis of its most noble attributes, not on the basis of fodder, pasture, and enclosure . . . There are, on the face of the earth, two parties: that of Allah and that of Satan . . . The *ummah* is the group of people bound together by belief (*'aqidah*), which constitutes their nationality. If there is no *'aqidah*, there is no *ummah*, for there is nothing to bind it together. Land, race, language, lineage, common material interests are not enough, either singly or in combination, to form an *ummah*.[24]
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> The Muslim has no homeland (*watan*) other than that which implements the *Shari'ah* . . . The Muslim has no nationality (*jinsiyyah*) other than his Creed which makes him a member of the 'Islamic *ummah*' in the Islamic homeland (*dar al-Islam*).[25]
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> The homeland (*al-watan*) is a place (*dar*) governed by *'aqidah*, and a program of life and the *Shari'ah* of Allah. This is the meaning of the homeland (*watan*) appropriate for human beings '*insan.*' The nationality (*al-jinsiyyah*) is *'aqidah* and program of life. This is the bond appropriate for human beings *'adamiyyun.*'[26]

These accounts sufficiently indicate that Quṭb connected nationalism to Islam in his writings of the early 1950s, not only in the late 1960s. He views nationalism as a creed, that is, Islam is the nationality of Muslims, and there is no nationality for Muslims except Islam. In this sense, Quṭb's view of nationalism was understood by his critics as "Islamic Nationalism (*al-qawmiyyah al-islamiyyah*), which 'Abd al-Nasser replaced with Arab Nationalism (*al-Qawmiyyah al-'Arabiyyah*)."[27] Thus, the idea of "Islamic nationalism" is not outside the framework of Quṭb's ideas of the early 1950s.

From the Qur'ānic basis for Quṭb's concept of nationalism is 30:30, which says "Set your face in devotion to the true faith, the upright nature (*fitrah*) with which Allah has endowed man (*fatara al-nasan 'alayha*). Allah's creation cannot be changed. This is the dominant religion (*al-din al-qayyim*)."

The Arabic word *qayyim* means straight, as opposed to crooked; standard, as opposed to irregular; definite and permanent, as opposed to casual or temporary. Therefore, the Arabs call "the master of command (*amir*) or leader, who legislates for the people, *qayyim*."[28] The word *qayyim* is used by the Qur'ān few times (i.e., 30:43; 18:2; 98:5; 9:36). The latter verse, for instance, states "This is the dominant (*qayyim*) religion. So wrong not yourselves." Similarly, the Qur'ānic verse 6:161 commanded the Prophet of Islam, "Say: 'My Lord has guided me to a straight path, to a dominant religion (*dinan qayyiman*).' The word *qayyim* commonly means dominant and power.

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Since "Islam possesses domination and power (*qayyim*), therefore, Islam is nationalistic (*qawmi*)."[29] In this sense, Quṭb rejects secular nationalism. For him, Islam is the nationalistic identity of all human beings.

Turning the discussion to focus on Arab and Egyptian nationalism, I now turn to Quṭb's involvement in this movement. But I should first note that there is no lack of books and articles on the sociopolitical implications of nationalism, the Western nationalistic movement, the creation of the nation-state and its influence on the East.[30] In short, Muslims came into contact with the West through Western military, commercial, and colonial expansionism in the eighteenth century. This awakened in the Muslim and Arab worlds a general emotional response, perhaps the origin of later nationalistic governments. The Arabs, for instance, viewed nationalism as important, a means to unity that would strengthen their cause for independence and self-government, and secure freedom from colonialism.[31] Quṭb's general ideological position meant that he rejected Arab nationalism as such. His criticism of the concept Arab nationalism is harsher.[32] The reason for this is as follows:

(i) Arab nationalism is based on principles that regard Islam as secondary to ethnic identity.

(ii) Arab nationalism may oppose, in some cases, the universality of Islam that is universality of *uluhiyyah* (divinity), and universality of *hakimiyyah* (sovereignty of Allah over everything) and universality of *'ubudiyyah* (servitude: complete submission of all humanity to Allah alone).

Quṭb's perspective clearly considers the integration and ascendancy of Islam primary in any theory about the mundane world. He argued that the sovereign law, the *Shari'ah*, aims to bring together all mankind into one moral and spiritual framework guiding people to care for one another on a universal scale. Islam presents to all humanity a social system of justice and piety based on a creed and a specific morality. Islam invites all humans towards this and applies to all spheres of human life (politics, economics, civics, legal rights and so on).[33]

In contrast, secular nationalism makes distinctions that create bitterness and hatred through racial and national distinctions, between nations. Countries end up fighting one another rather than helping one another.[34] In his explanation of the Qur'ānic verses 3:164–179, Quṭb emphasizes the similarity between modern Arab nationalism and the *jahiliyyah* of the Arabs of the pre-Islamic times. He comments:

> The *jahiliyyah* is the *jahiliyyah*, and each *jahiliyyah* has its types and forms of abominations, atrocities, enormities and taboos. The form of *jahiliyyah* of a particular time or place is not important. If there is no *Shari'ah* governing the daily affairs of the people, there will be nothing

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but *jahiliyyah* in any of its varying forms and shapes. The nature of the *jahiliyyah* of the world today is not different from the nature of the *jahiliyyah* of Arabia or the *jahiliyyah* of the world before Islam. The Arabs know that nothing transferred them from the stage of the tribe, the interests and revolts of the tribe, except Islam. Islam made them not only an *ummah* (nation) but also an *ummah* to lead humanity to the ideal program and system of life. They know that nothing gave them their national existence (*wujud qawmi*), their political existence (*wujud siyasi*), their international existence (*wujud dawli*) and their humanity, except Islam. Islam gave the Arabs a message to be delivered to the world, a theory for human life, and a distinctive system for humanity. This was Islam: its concept of existence, its view of life; its social laws, its organization of the life of humanity; its ideal *Shari'ah* for establishing a system for every human being to live in happiness. This was Islam with all its particular characteristics, the identity card (*al-bitaqah al-shakhsiyyah*) by which the world has come to know the Arabs and to whom it has handed over leadership. Today, the Arabs have nothing more than this card. They have no message other than this message to address themselves to the world. If they carry it [the identity card: the message], the world will recognize them and respect them. If they do not carry it [identity card: the message], they will return to their status [i.e., *jahiliyyah*] prior to Islam, when nobody recognized them. They do not have anything other than Islam to present to humanity. Only Islam is the identity card (*al-bitaqah al-shakhsiyyah*).[35]

Thus, Islam is the nationality of the Arabs and they have no nationality except Islam. In this sense, Islamic society is distinguished by its nature and physical components from any society of any time, old or modern. To Quṭb, there is no room for Arabs to establish an Islamic society on any basis other than Islam.[36]

The expression "Arab Nationalism" implies division, not *tawhid*.[37] During Quṭb's time the official title of most Arab countries was not linked with Islam and the word Islam was not included in any title. After independence, most Arab countries identified themselves simply as a 'Republic' or 'kingdom.' Arab nationalism has served to signal language, territory, territorial culture and racial and sub-racial distinctiveness. However, the term 'Arab nationalism' was inherently opposed to the universality of Islam, the universality of *hakimiyyah*, *'ubudiyyah*, and the universality of *uluhiyyah* (divinity). The logical implication of this is that 'Arab nationalism' implies division, not universality of the *tawhid*, the basis and cornerstone of Muslim belief.[38]

Nationalism, generally, signifies the special relationships that link certain individuals to one another. Social values, language, culture and history lead individuals to come together in a social bond that is ultimately called nation. The desire of "each nation, which is proud of its history and language, to

govern itself, has been an important movement which led the change in the European map several times and resulted in the separation of state from religion."[39] Similarly, nationalist movements in the Arab world arose from the desire for unity and self-rule but "resulted in their division and the creation of nation-state that separated religion from state."[40] Arab nationalism, then, has separated the Arab countries from each other on the political, economic, social and intellectual levels and separated them also from the rule of *Shari'ah*.

For Quṭb, as for Abduh, "Arab nationalists are well-informed by Western culture but, like their counterparts in the West, Arab nationalists lack sufficient information on the side of the nationalistic trend of the Islamic heritage, which is human and universal in nature."[41] In this regard, Quṭb emphasizes that the Arabs know that the term "nationalism," in practice today, is of a secular nature. Adding the term Arab, which denotes a specific race and a specific language, to the term "nationalism" resulted in a complex secular expression called "Arab nationalism." This is why Quṭb calls such expression complex *jahiliyyah*.[42]

Arab nationalism is central in the debate between Islamists and nationalists in the Muslim and Arab countries.[43] For example, al-Dawalibi (1984) argues that

> The nationalist bond in any nation is under the threat of division
> and apathy under the influence of various factors, especially
> people migrating from their motherland, unless they had a stable and
> permanent social, and human value to unite them in carrying a message
> to mankind wherever they reside. This has happened to the Arabs
> themselves when they migrated outside the peninsula and spread in Iraq
> and North Africa from Egypt to Morocco. This was what happened, for
> instance, to the Babylonians, the Assyrians, the Phoenicians and the
> Ancient Egyptians. The Islamic message which had reached them
> through their Arab cousins was the only thing which united them and
> brought them back to the mother tongue, thanks to the language of the
> Qur'ān ...[44]

According to Maspero (1910), the Babylonians, Assyrians, Phoenicians and the Ancient Egyptians were all Arabs departed from their motherland and then departed from their mother tongue with the passage of years.[45] Consequently, Quṭb notes that the return of these people to their original Arab identities and language could not have been possible without the "language of Islam."

Quṭb calls Arabic language after Islam "Islamic language," lends it great importance and uses it to support his Islamist view of nationalism. In this regard, his point about those nations, which was referred to by Maspero, is one of his arguments. In his view, Islam Islamized Arabic language and made it capable of bringing those nations back to their original Arabic language.

In other words, if present Arabs do not carry the Islamic message, they will lose their identity, as happened to the "Babylonians," the "Assyrians," the "Phoenicians" and the "Ancient Egyptians," before Islam. Quṭb emphasizes that the "Islamic language" carried to these nations a new life system that meant freedom of belief and culture for all and the right of everybody to an honorable life without making any distinctions. Islamic language brought to the Arabs the necessity to be good to those who differed from them in faith under the new universal and humanitarian system that is unique to the message of the Qur'ān.[46] In this sense, Quṭb develops his argument to magnify the importance of Islamic language, as in the following accounts:

> The victory of the Islamic language in the battle with ancient countries is a remarkable phenomenon that, unfortunately, has not received systematic study or analysis. From my view the victory of the Islamic language is more remarkable than the victory of the Creed (ʿaqidah) and its establishment. Change the language, which interweaves all social life of the people, Arabs and non-Arabs, is a complete miracle! The factor behind this matter of change was not the 'Arabic language.' Arabic language was in Arabia long before Islam . . . The new energy which has renewed Arabic language was only Islam . . . Therefore, I call it [Arabic language after Islam] 'Islamic language.' The language, which has changed the history, was the Islamic language . . .
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> In the countries liberated by Islam, the geniuses went on to express themselves, not by their native languages but by the new language, the 'Islamic language.' They produced works in every field of knowledge. The Islamic language became, actually, the mother tongue for these geniuses. This was because the energy of Islam and the nature of the obligation that this language [Islamic language] is carrying were closer to the soul of these geniuses than their ancient cultures and languages. This energy was only Islam. . . .[47]

In Quṭb's view, Arabic is elevated to the language in which Allah revealed the Qur'ān to mankind. The Qur'ān influenced Arabic language, the matrix of the Qur'ān and of Islam in general, and gave the language new categories of thought, new terms, meanings, and concepts. Arabic grammar, syntax and sentence structure were derived from the Qur'ān. The divine status of the Qur'ān sanctified the Arabic language, developed and preserved it unchanged, and will continue to govern it as long as there is Qur'ān. This position implies that no other language is to be preserved unchanged and alive, or to remain perfect as the exalted standard of the highest and excellent expression of Arabic. The Qur'ān made the Arabic language the language of Islam and no language of any Muslim group, whether or not it has achieved a lofty rank in civilization, is without the influence.[48] In regard to Arabic language, the Qur'ān made art of clear expression (bayan), with primary quality and proclaimed

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clarity, in adjectival and perspicuous style (*mubin*), and as one of its most important virtues.[49]

The Arabicity of the Qur'ān raised the Arabic language from regional to international status. The Arabicity of the Qur'ān, as Qutb says, "does not contradict the universal status of Islam as a worldwide religion."[50] In other words, the concept of "Islamic language" does not contradict the Arabicity of the Qur'ān and its universal message. Regarding the universality of the Qur'ān and the message of Muhammad, the Qur'ān 34:28 states: "We have not sent thee but as a bearer of glad tidings and a Warner, for all mankind, but most men know not." It also says "We have indeed sent it as an Arabic Qur'ān in order that you may learn wisdom" (Qur'ān, 12:2). In order to understand the wisdom of the message of this Qur'ān and the traditions of the Prophet, knowledge of Arabic became essential. Thus, Arabic became the official language of Islam,[51] but the message of Islam is embodied in all languages of Muslims. Many of these languages have adopted Arabic Islamic terminology in religious and related discourse. This also illustrates what Qutb meant by calling Arabic the "Islamic language."

To Qutb, the Qur'ān raised both the Arabic language, Arabs, and the Muslim *ummah* as a whole to international status. In his words, "the Qur'ān raised up this *ummah* and made it a unique *ummah* in the history of humanity. You are the noblest *ummah* ever raised up for mankind" (Qur'ān, 3:110). Qutb drew on these texts to emphasize that Islam was a new birth, not only for this *ummah* but also for the human being. It was a new birth for the Arab nation (*Ummah 'Arabiyyah*) and all mankind. The Jahili Poetry (*shi'r jahili*) and other texts scattered here and there have all been considered as a record (*diwan*) of the Arab's pre-Islamic life and their behavior and conceptions of the creation, the universe, life and ethics before Islam. Comparing those concepts in the Arab's record before Islam with that in the Qur'ān, we see that the Qur'ān is the unique gift to this *ummah*.[52]

The Qur'ān points out that Arabs could not have received the message and become the vehicles for its promulgation if it had not been sent in the Arabic tongue (*lisan*) and delivered by an Arab person. The Qur'ān (26:192–199) says: "Verily this is a Revelation from the Lord of the World . . . In the perspicuous Arabic tongue . . . Had We revealed it to any of the non-Arabs, and had he recited it to them, they would not have believed in it." In this regard, Qutb notes that "this is the tongue of Salman the Persian, and 'Abdullah Ibn Salam."[53] Here Qutb implies two things: (i) that the energy of Islam renewed the Arabic language and raised it from regional to international status. Arabic became the "Islamic language" of the Muslims, Arabs and non-Arabs; and (ii) Islamic language is not merely an alphabet, letters, or words, but it can be seen as "The *Lingua Franca*" of the Muslim *ummah*. It is a matter of fact

that "during the whole 500 years of the 'Abbasid Caliphate's existence, Arabic was the *lingua franca* of the whole area extending from Soviet Central Asia to Spain and Portugal inclusive."[54] The reason is that Arabic became "the pulse of both Arabism and Islam."[55] Arabic became the language of the Qur'ān, hadith, prayers and main references on Islam. Precisely because of this, as noted by Muḥammad Abduh, it is supposed to be learned by every Muslim with some degree of proficiency.[56] Therefore, Quṭb emphazises that because of the energy of Islam, Arabic became 'Islamic language' and the mother tongue of the "geniuses who went on to express themselves, not by their original languages but by the new language, the 'Islamic Language.' They produced works in every field of knowledge."[57]

Many of those whom Quṭb calls "geniuses" were not Arabs. As to this fact, Ibn Khaldun (d. 1406) emphasizes that "Most of those who established and developed the science of Arabic and the science of jurisprudence, hadith and other sciences related to the Qur'ān were not Arabs."[58] This implies that Islam freed the Arabic language from regional or racial restriction. In other words, Islam freed the language from regional nationalism. This means that the criterion for a language affiliation is fluency and perfection in using it, and not blood or racial relations with a language community. The Prophet was reported to have said; "Oh mankind, verily the Lord is only one, and the father is only one, and the religion is only one, and Arabic is not of any of you through maternal or paternal relations, it is an act of tongue, and whoever speaks Arabic is an Arab."[59]

This tradition frees Arabic from regional limitations and raises it to the universal status that corresponds to the universality of the message of Islam. Many of the nations that embraced Islam abandoned their native languages to speak Arabic, while others use its form of writing. Individuals from the new Muslim nations, as Quṭb asserts, excelled in Arabic Islamic sciences to the extent that the majority of early Muslim scholars were not Arabs.[60] Explaining this phenomenon, Ibn Khaldun emphasizes that natural acquisition of language has no connection with racial origin of the learner. In his view, being non-Arab in language is something different from being non-Arab by racial origin.[61]

Thus, Quṭb notes that the Arabs cannot be united on the basis of merely their Arabic language or through the slogan of "Arab nationalism." Modern-day Arabs cannot attain unity on the basis other than the message that united the Arabs and non-Arabs in first place. In other words, the nationality of Muslims is Islam. This echoes Muḥammad 'Abduh's view that "the nationality (*jinsiyyah*) of the Muslims is only their religion."[62] 'Abd al-Rahman Tajj (1896–1975), a Western educated professor, who became Shaykh al-Azhar in 1952 after the Revolution states that "Arab nationalism is a *bid'ah* (heresy) appeared

to remove the Arabs from Islam. It considers Islam as a factor of weakness, not strength . . ."[63] Quṭb describes Arab nationalism as an idolatrous expression and a pagan slogan. He states that,

> the pagans have a variety of idols that sometimes called homeland (*watan*) and race (*jins*) or nation (*qawm*). These forms of idols appear from time to time — once under the name of popularity (*shu'ubiyyah*), once under the name of Hittite nationalism (*al-jinsiyyah al-turaniyyah*) and once more under the name Arab nationalism (*al-qawmiyyah al-Arabiyyah*) and sometimes under various names and flags . . .[64]

In dismissing the idea of nation-state, Quṭb's criticism is also harsher. Consequently, he views the modern nation-state like a "tribal society," similar to the society of the pre-Islamic period.[65] In his commentary on the case of the *qiblah*[66] in the Qur'ānic verses 2:42–45, Quṭb states that "Islam has come to liberate the hearts and the souls from all historical, racial, and earthly circumstances, and to liberate them from tribalism, and all *jahili* slogans. Islam came to link the hearts and the souls directly to Allah and unite the *ummah* in the belief of the One Allah, one religion, one system and even one *qiblah* to which all Muslims in the world turn in prayer. Islam has established this unity on neither racial or language basis nor other similar *jahili* slogans. Unity under Islam is appropriate for human beings . . . The unity of human beings is the unity of their hearts and souls in one direction, one path and to follow one law in a complete submission to the One Sovereign."[67]

Quṭb argues that the concept of nation-state is a reflection of "multiplicity of wills that give rise to different rules and judgments that lead to conflicts between individuals, groups and nations. The Prophet rejected the nation-state based on language, race or color."[68] Critics, however, could argue that nationalism is a modern concept, and that the nation-state was not an issue during the time of the prophet of Islam.[69]

However, the nationalist movement, in general, can be traced back to the ancient Egyptians of 3100 BC. This point will be briefly outlined later in this article. Nevertheless, Arab nationalists of the seventh century were perhaps considering themselves modern when they were looking at the Egyptian nationalist movement of 3100 BC. Similarly, the Arab nationalist movement of the twentieth century considered itself modern in relation to the Arab nationalist movement of the seventh century AD.

Quṭb emphazises that Arabia of the seventh century witnessed two nationalist movements in Makkah: the Islamic nationalist movement led by the Prophet, and the Arab nationalist movement led by Abu Sufyan.[70] The sociopolitical particularities, development and obligations of these two movements are familiar ground in Arabic literature.[71] In 616 AD, soon after the beginning of the Revelation in 610/611 AD, Abu Sufyan (father of Mu'awiyah

d. 680 AD) established the Arab Tribal League to lead the opposition of the Arab nationalist movement against the Islamic nationalist movement in Makkah. The leading council of the Arab Tribal League raised the issue of Arab nationalism, since they tried to persuade the Prophet, through his uncle, to accept their proposal of Arab nation-state. Their plan provides the kingship for Muḥammad, but he must first stop the activity of the Islamic nationalist movement. They agreed to make Muḥammad the king of Arabia. They agreed to leave under the sovereignty of Muḥammad, not under the sovereignty of Allah. The Prophet rejected their proposal, and made his position clear in a well-known speech.[72]

The issue of Arab nationalism in seventh century Arabia exposed its secular and racial essence, since the issue was moved from the phase of dialogue between the Arab and Islamic nationalists to enter the phase of military confrontation in the second year after the *hijrah* (2 AH/623 AD).[73] The end of this conflict is marked by the conquest of Makkah (629 AD) by the Muslim nationalists. Then the members and leaders of the Arab Tribal League and its Arab nationalist movement became Muslims by their free choice, and joined the Islamic nationalist movement led by the Prophet.[74] Quṭb notes:

> It was easier for the Prophet to establish *al-qawmiyyah al-ʿArabiyyah* (Arab nationalism) based on the Arab language and history. He then can launch a war of national liberation to liberate the Arab land from the Romans in the north of Arabia and to liberate the south from the Persians. He was able to raise Pan-Arabism up high and establish a strong Arab state to unite all Arab tribes in the Arabian Peninsula. This, however, was not the right path and was not the message of the Qurʾān. The Qurʾān delivers the Islamic Revolution against the earthly rules and earthly ties . . .
>
> Regional nationalism was not the right path, as it would liberate the Arabs from the sovereignty of the Roman *taghut* (any form of oppression: tyranny, rulers, rule and law) or from the sovereignty of the Persian *taghut* to be under the sovereignty of an Arab *taghut*. The *taghut* is but *taghut*. The earth is under the sovereignty of Allah and it must be liberated for the sake of Allah. Liberation of the earth means to raise the word 'there is no God but God,' and to liberate the people from the *ʿubudiyyah* (servitude) to anything other than God. The Arabs of that time know their language and know that the phrase 'there is no God but God' means there is no *hakimiyyah* (sovereignty) other than the *hakimiyyah* of Allah, and there is no *Shariʿah* but the *Shariʿah* of Allah . . .[75]
>
> The nationality envisaged by the Qurʾān is the *ʿaqidah* (creed) in which the Roman, Persian, Arabian and all races and colors are equal under the law of Allah. This is the only bond that linked the Arabians,

Persians, Babylonians, Assyrians, Phoenicians, Egyptians, Moroccans, Turks, Chinese, Indians, Romans, Greeks, Indonesians, and the Africans and so on to the end of races and tongues. They were all united, their specialties cooperated and harmoniously worked to build the Islamic society and Islamic civilization. This great civilization never was, at anytime, Arabic but was always Islamic.[76]

Turning to Egyptian nationalism, there is a tendency among intellectuals to locate the origin of the Egyptian nationalist movement in the year 1798. The time when three months after the French invasion more than a thousand persons led by Shaykh Badr marched towards the house of community government known as *"Bayt al-Qadi"* (house of the jurist) shouting anti-French slogans.[77]

Critics argue that Egyptian nationalism could be traced back to the time of the Ancient Egyptians. King Menes led the Egyptian nationalist movement, united the South with the North of Egypt and established the Egyptian nation-state in 3100 BC.[78] The Egyptian state of the 3100 BC had its national capital city,[79] national court of 42 jurists,[80] national flag, national anthem and a national official sign.[81] All these are among the significant characteristics of the modern nation-state and its sovereignty in the twentieth century world. In his speech to the government concerning the expected war with the Hittites,[82] King Ramses stated that,

Egypt is our mother, our past and our future. She gives without calculating, at every moment she offers us her bounty. Shall we answer her with ingratitude, selfishness and cowardice? If need be, Pharaoh himself will lay down his life in order that Egypt may live.[83]

These words constitute the sociopolitical implications of the modern concept of nationalism. This means that if the term nationalism is modern, its components and implications, at least, are ancient. The difference between ancient and modern Egyptian nationalism is that the ancients did not separate their creed from their state but based their nation-state totally on their religion.[84] By contrast, the modern concept of nationalism gave rise to a modern nation-state in which religion became of secondary importance to language and history.[85]

In twentieth century Egypt, according to Muhammad Hasanayn Haykal, the eminent writer and journalist of the Nasser era,

. . . the revolution of 1919 was a nationalist movement separated religion from the state. Islamic nationalism was also not addressed by the revolution of 1952. Egyptian thinkers such as al-Tahtawi, Taha Husayn, Tawfiq al-Hakim, Muhammad Husayn Haykal, and al-'Aqqad did not address Islamic nationalism because of the sensitivity of the issue . . .[86]

Haykal was perhaps trying, through the revolution of 1919, to justify the secularization processes of the revolution of 1952. According to Jeremy Salt, "the Revolution of 1952 modified the concept of nationalism into ideas in which Islam has come to be the second important to language and history."[87] This implies an important question about Qutb's concept of nationalism during his active participation with the members of the revolution of 1952 in Egypt.

Concerning this question, one should note that Qutb was one among those who too part in the planning of the Egyptian revolution of 1952.[88] The Revolutionary Council called Qutb "the tribune of the Egyptian Revolution."[89] They may have recalled the French Mirabeau Comte de (1749–1791), who prepared for the French Revolution and was called "the tribune of the people."[90] On the Egyptian radio, in a series that lasted for about six months, Qutb personally explained the Islamic aim of the Egyptian Revolution of 1952.[91] This indicates that Qutb's acceptance of nationalism at that time was due to its Islamic aim and that Egypt was, for him, the starting point or a step towards the unity of Muslim nations. In an article entitled "Mabadi' al-'Alam al-Hur" (The Principles of the Free World), published in January 1952 and then republished with other articles in the book *Dirasat Islamiyyah* (Islamic Studies) in 1953, Qutb pointed out his ideological position regarding Egyptian and Arab nationalism in 1952 (six months before the revolution):

> The flag which unites us in our struggle is the flag of Islam. Among us, a number of people prefer to be associated (*yatajamma'u*) under the Arab flag (*al-rayah al-'arabiyyah*). I have no objection to this association (*al-tajammu'*) being transitory (*waqtiyyan*) as a step on the road of a wider association. There is no conflict (*ta'arud*) between Arab nationalism (*al-qawmiyyah al-'Arabiyyah*) and Islamic Patriotism (*al-wataniyyah al-islamiyyah*), only if we understood Arab nationalism as a step on the road. All the Arab land is part of the land of Islam. If we liberate the Arab land, it means we liberate part of the body of the Islamic homeland (*al-watan al-islami*), which could be used to help in the liberation of the rest of the Muslim land. The point is to get it started . . .[92]

Qutb's view of nationalism as appears in the article above became the subject of the debate between intellectuals on the pages of *al-Risalah*. Muhammad 'Asim wrote an article entitled "Mushkilatina fi Daw' al-Islam" (Our Problems in the Light of Islam). 'Asim provided some materials from the nationalists themselves, and in his analysis, he appeared to be in agreement with Qutb's view on the subject. Qutb also responded. In this regard, Qutb's publisher, al-Shuruq, published Qutb's book *Dirasat Islamiyyah*, which consisted of some of Qutb's articles, a single article by Muhammad 'Asim, and

Quṭb's response entitled "Bila Taʿliq" (Without Comment). In his article,
ʿAsim says:

> In the previous issue of *al-Risalah*, the eminent writer Sayyid Quṭb
> wrote in his article 'The Principles of the Free World' that 'Among us a
> number of people prefer be associated under the Arab flag. I have no
> objection that this association to be transitory as a step on the road of a
> wider association. There is no conflict between the Arab nationalism and
> Islamic Patriotism, if we understand Arab nationalism as a step on the
> road . . .' But do the 'nationalists' understand nationalism to be a step on
> the road to a wider 'Islamic' unity (*al-wahdah al-islamiyyah al-kubra*)?
> This is the question. The reality is that 'nationalists' neither understand
> nationalism, nor do they do anything for it on this basis . . . Satiʿal-Husari
> — who is one of the leading thinkers of Arab nationalism says that the
> reason for 'Antuwan Saʿadah'[93] walking away from 'Arabism' is the
> association of Arabism with Islam in his mind. If he knows that 'Arabism'
> is something independent (*munfasil*) from Islam and unattached to
> it, he would not charge Arabism and call it primitive, reactionary,
> retardation, and fanaticism . . . These mirror the creed of most
> nationalists. They say that Islam answered the need of the Arabs in
> specific time and specific space, which are different from the present. . . .
> The nationalists do not understand 'Arab nationalism' in the way that the
> eminent writer Sayyid Quṭb understands it. Their nationalism, therefore,
> is not a step on the road . . .[94]

Quṭb's response entitled "Without Comment" was this:

> The text presented by brother Muḥammad ʿAsim from Satiʿal-Husari —
> if accurate — to portray the idea of the advocators of Arab nationalism,
> does not require comment from me. The text indicates the deep *jahl*
> about both Islam and Arabism. It will be nonsense to discuss this level
> of *jahalah* of those who lack the alphabet of Islam and Arabism. As you
> have seen — the Arab *ummah* is but a section (*bidʿah*: piece or part) in
> the body of the Islamic homeland (*al-watan al-islami*).[95]

Thus, Quṭb's ideological position involves the concept of nationalism,
in his writings before or after the 1952 Revolution, is Islam and "Islamic
Patriotism" (*wataniyyah Islamiyyah*). Then Quṭb pointed out that "there is no
conflict (*taʿarud*) between Arab nationalism (*al-qawmiyyah al-ʿArabiyyah*)
and Islamic Patriotism (*al-wataniyyah al-islamiyyah*), only if we understood
Arab nationalism as a step on the road."[96]

After 1952, when Quṭb found the Revolutionary Council was not ready to
carry on the Islamic program, he distanced from them and pointed out that the
concept of nationalism after 1952 changed and lost its historical basis.[97]

In his commentary on the Qurʾānic verses 2:142–152 of the second part of
Zilal, which was published in 1953 (before his detention, and then revised

after his detention), Quṭb emphasized regional nationalism as a slogan of *jahiliyyah*. Quṭb drew on the case of the *qiblah* to emphasize that Islam freed all hearts from the slogans related to regional nationalism, lineage, land, and history. He says,

> The diversion of the *qiblah*, firstly from the Kaʿbah to the farthest Mosque, was a wisdom of an educational purpose indicated by the verse [2:143] 'And We appointed the *qiblah* to which thou wast used, Only to test those who followed the Messenger from those who would turn on their heels [from the faith].' In their *jahiliyyah*, the Arabs were glorifying the Sacred House [Kaʿbah] and considered it the great symbol of their Nationalism. Because Islam aims to free the hearts from anything but Allah — and from any slogan related to anything except the Islamic program (*manhaj islami*) — therefore, Islam pulled them out (*nazaʿahum*) from the direction of the Sacred House and declared for them the direction of the farthest Mosque [in Jerusalem], for a period of time to free their souls from the precipitates of *jahiliyyah*, and to distinguish between those who would follow the Messenger from those who would turn on their heels with pride to the *jahili* slogan related to race, lineage, land, and history.[98]
>
> The *qiblah* does not mean mere place or direction to which the Muslims turn in the prayer. The place or direction is but a symbol meant for distinction and specification. Distinction in the conception (*tasawwur*), in the identity, in the goal, in the interests, and distinction in the entity.[99]

In Quṭb's view, "the *ummah* (nation) is not a group of consecutive generations of a specific race, but a group of the believers (*mu'minin*) no matter what their race, country (*awtanuhum*), or color are."[100] In his last book, *Maʿalim*, Quṭb says:

> Islam came to this humanity with a new conception about the bonds and connections . . . Islam came to declare: that there is only one bond connecting the people in the name of Allah; that there is only one party of Allah but the others are of Satan and tyranny (*taghut*); that there is only one road that leads to Allah but the others lead not to Him; that there is only one system, that is the system of Islam but the others are systems of *jahiliyyah*; that there is only one *Shariʿah*, that is the *Shariʿah* of Allah but the others are whim; that the truth is only one, not numerous; and that anything other than the truth is error; and that there is only one homeland (*dar wahidah*), that is the homeland in which the Islamic state is established, and the *Shariʿah* of Allah is dominant.[101]

Quṭb's concept of nationalism, before and after the 1952 revolution, was Islam. He also calls for "Islamic Patriotism."[102] Nationalism, which Quṭb called *jahiliyyah*, is the regional and territorial nationalism in which Islam is not of primary importance to historic change.

Quṭb's concept of nationalism in connection to Islam was similar to Muḥammad 'Abduh's and al-Banna's. These three Muslim thinkers emphasized that the nationality of the Muslim is his or her creed. They also stressed that the responsibility towards nationalism should first be the responsibility of the Arabs and that the other Muslim communities are the Arab's partners.

'Abduh notes that,

> The nationality (*jinsiyyah*) of the Muslims is only their religion.[103] Allah has guided the Arabs by the Qur'ān and guided by their *da'wa* the powerful nation of Persia and led the world to the liberation of man. Guided by the Qur'ān, the Arabs liberated the land, liberated the soul and demolished the authority of the Persian and Roman Empires . . .[104]

Similar to Quṭb, 'Abduh described modern nationalism *jahiliyyah* and emphasized Arabic language, after Islam, Islamic language as follows:

> In the early period of Islam, all those who became Muslims believed that they were brothers. Every one of them feels that he is brother to all Muslims and his nation (*ummatuhu*) is not the Arab nation, nor the Persian, the Coptic or Turkish but the nation of Islam, as God says in verse 21:92 'This nation of yours is one nation, and I am Your only Lord. Therefore serve Me.' It is known that the unity of the *ummah* cannot be established without the unity of the language. There is no language uniting the Muslims and connecting them together except the language of the religion which made them brothers in the name of Allah. This language is the Arabic language which became unrestricted to the Arab race . . . The nationalism of the *jahiliyyah* (*al-jinsiyyah al-jahiliyyah*), which was prohibited by Islam, prevailed in the Muslim world after the Muslims became weak in their language and belief . . .[105]

In 'Abduh's statement, the language of the Muslims cannot be Arabic or Persian but the Islamic language. This also does not differ from Quṭb's view, as detailed above. Similarly, al-Banna stated,

> Islam emphasizes that every Muslim must do as much as he can for his *ummah* where he lives and he must defend it. Islam has commanded the Muslim to begin with his nearest relative and then the nearest neighbor and so on, in that order. We are Egyptians by this precious piece of land on which we were born and grew up . . . Why do we not work for Egypt and defend it? We are proud of our beloved native place, working for it, defending it and we will remain believing that Egypt is the first step on the way to the nation of Islam (*ummah*).[106]

Likewise, Quṭb pointed out that the Arabs will be able to lead the world if they present themselves to the world as Muslims, not Arabs. He says:

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The Arabs have nothing to present to humanity except Islam. If they carried their Book, to present themselves to the world, the world would recognize them. But if they presented themselves on the basis of Arab nationality — [the world would ask] who are they? What is the value of this lineage without this Book?[107]

The Arabs know that Islam — and only Islam — made them responsible for a message and charged them to deliver it to the world. [Islam brought to them] a theory and a distinctive ideology for the life of humanity. In the field of humanity, the *ummah* cannot exist[108] without a message (*risalah*), a theory (*nazariyyah*), and ideology (*madhhab*) . . . It is only Islam and its conception of existence (*wujud*), its view of life, its *Shari'ah* for the society, its realistic and dynamic program that can bring happiness to humanity. It is only Islam, with these characteristics, the 'personal identity' by which the world has come to know the Arabs, to respect them, and to pass the leadership over to them. For every great *ummah* has a message. The greater the message, the greater is the *ummah* which is ordained to deliver this message. The Arabs possess this message, they are proper to it, and other peoples are the Arab's partners . . .[109]

Regarding Quṭb's words ". . . the Arabs . . . are proper to it . . ." in the quotation above, critics could argue that there is residual Arabism in Quṭb thought. Here, the argument implies that there is opposition between Arabism and Islamism. In this sense, the argument reflects the lack of understanding the fact of the relationship between Arabism and Islamism. Here is a topic for discussion, but Arabic as Islamic language was previously discussed in some detail (see above). Here, however, one should note that there is no opposition between Arabism and Islamism. In this sense, Quṭb has Arabism with Islamism in him. This is because the Qur'ān is Arabic, and only the Arabic Qur'ān is the Qur'ān. Arabic language is the matrix of the Qur'ān and of Islam in general. The Qur'ān standardized the Arabic language and gave it new categories of thought, new terms, and new concepts. Arabic grammar, syntax and sentence structure were derived from the Qur'ān. In this, the Qur'ān and Islam in general made Arabism stand in a special relation with Islamism. This means that to Islamize the mind is to Qur'ānize it, and to Qur'ānize it, it is necessary to Arabize it. In other words, Arabism and Islamism are inseparable. In this sense, Quṭb has both Arabism with Islamism in him. Accordingly, Quṭb emphasizes that Arab's association under the 'Arab flag' should be "a step on the road of a wider association [i.e., one Muslim *ummah*]. There is no opposition (*ta'arud*) between Arab nationalism (*al-qawmiyyah al-'arabiyyah*) and Islamic patriotism (*al-wataniyyah al-Islamiyyah*), only if we understood Arab nationalism as a step on the road."[110]

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In early 1960s, during the Nasser era, the Azharite thinker Muḥammad al-Bahayy and rector of Al-Azhar University considered the creation of the Egyptian nation state as an indicator of the polarization of Muslim identity. This polarization is caused by Orientalists, the heirs and modern forces of crusaders. As outlined by Abu-Rabiʿ (1996), Al-Bahayy "considers Orientalists to be the modern heirs to the crusaders . . . Orientalism is the cultural side of colonialism . . . As a result of colonialism, there has been an intense polarization in the modern Muslim identity. This polarization can be overcome only if the national liberation movements — such as Nasserism — that were suffering from the vacuum created by colonialism, were to practice Islam as a system of life."[111] The point is that Quṭb, like al-Banna, al-Bahayy and ʿAbduh, believed that Egypt, his native home, was the first step on the road to one Muslim nation whose identity is Islam.

Turning the discussion to focus on Quṭb's concept of the term *ummah*, we should note that the term *ummah* is usually translated as nation. To examine his view, the concept of the term *ummah* in the Qurʾān and in the Sunnah will be investigated and compared to Quṭb's view.

The term *ummah* is mentioned 64 times in the Qurʾān,[112] and established a variety of concepts that have been the driving force of Muslims political, social, economic, intellectual and moral lives. According to Leopold Weiss (Muḥammad Asad, 1980), the establishment of the Muslim state by the Prophet and later that of the Caliphate represents one of the basic reasons why the meaning of the term *ummah* and the identity of the *ummah* itself is considered apolitical.[113] In this regard, I should note that the Qurʾān brought about social transformation based upon the psychological foundation of the Qurʾānic creed of monotheism. The Qurʾān transformed Arabs and their tribal society, which was organized on the principles of kinship and tribal laws of the pre-Islamic days, to an *ummah* (Arabs and non-Arabs) with a broad moral duty of "commanding right and forbidding wrong" (Qurʾān 3:110). A duty, according to Michael Cook, characterizes the *ummah* of Islam (2:134, 141).[114] Islam came to condition the patterns of thinking and actions of the people in order to fashion them into a new social unity. The new terminology that came into use to describe this new community, its members, and its ideology was set forth by the Qurʾān in explicit terms. The Qurʾān described the new community as *ummah* (Qurʾān 2:128, 143; 3:110), its members as the *muʾminun* (faithful, Qurʾān 8:74; 9:74; 23:1), and the ideology as Islam or complete submission to Allah alone (Qurʾān 2:19; 10:105; 29:11).

The term *ummah* is generally used in the Qurʾān in the restricted sense of society based upon divine guidance, but in our age, the term *ummah* has come to be translated as *nation*. Here I note that the meaning that the term

'nation' in current English usage conveys does not have an appropriate Arabic equivalent. The English term *nation* as a political term is translated to the word *qawm* in modern Arabic. But the word *qawm*, in the context of the Qur'ān, does not connote *nation* in the modern sense. [115] In this regard, Montgomery Watt comments:

> The fundamental pre-Islamic conception was that of tribe or kinship for which the commonest word was *qawm* . . . towards the end of the Makkan period, however, the word *ummah* makes its appearance in the Qur'ān. At first, it is equivalent to *qawm*, and it is regarded as possible for an *ummah* to oppose and reject the messenger sent to it by God. Mostly, however, the *ummah* is the community formed by those who accept the messenger and his message. This development in the meaning of ummah is doubtless bound up with the rejection of Muḥammad by the majority of the Makkans and his plan to move to Madinah. The first article of the Constitution of Madinah is that the Muslims of Quraysh and Yathrib (Madinah) and their associates contribute a single *ummah*. As the Muslim community in Madinah prospered, the word *ummah* came to be more and more restricted to a community with a religious basis.[116]

The term *ummah* then is a political term. In fact, all life (political and otherwise) of the *ummah* is confined to its specific constitution, that is, the Qur'ān and the *Sunnah* upon which the *ummah* (Muslim community) was established in Madinah.[117] The sociopolitical implications of the term *ummah* are obvious; for instance, in the document which was agreed upon among the inhabitants of Madinah (Yathrib) and the new immigrants (from Makkah) to the city. The document named the Prophet Muḥammad the Chief Executive of the city. The document declares itself

> A document from Muḥammad, the Prophet, among the believers [*mu'minin*] and Muslims of Quraysh [the Makkan Muslim immigrants] and Yathrib [Muslims of Madinah], and those who followed them and lived with them and went with them to *jihad*. They constituted one single *ummah* [*ummatan wahidah*] to the exclusion of all other people [*min dun al-nas*].[118]

The document goes on to show the regulations concerning the administration and security of the city of Madinah. Among the implications of this document is the fact that the Muslims received and enjoyed recognition as a distinct community and in which the city of Madinah became a confederation. This means that the word *ummah* is a comprehensive term with political, economic, social, intellectual, and moral connotations.[119] Therefore, Muslim scholars and the *'ulama* usually used the term *ummah* to refer to the nation of Islam in the political sense. According to the Qur'ān, the

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term *ummah* signifies a united nation (not nations), that is, the nation of the Islamic creed.[120] Islamic creed legislates for Muslims and non-Muslims alike.

Critics could argue that the term *ummah* is synonymous with the term nation. However, practical application of the two indicates the differences between them. The two concepts, according to Quṭb, are different in their ideological particularities and historical contexts.[121]

According to Quṭb, "*ummah*" was revealed in Makkah and Madinah to declare the new basic principles of the social bond that should tie people of all races, colors and languages.[122] In the context of Qur'ānic verses 21:92; 23:52, this bond is only the Islamic creed. The term *ummah* then, Quṭb claims, is totally based on *tawhid, ʿubudiyyah, hakimiyyah* and the comprehensive Islamic conception concerning the nature of the relationship between the Creator and the creation, the universe, life and Man.[123] Thus, the term *ummah* implies the unity of people of different races, colors and languages under the law of the one sovereign who brought them to life, legislates for them and to whom they will all return.[124] To Quṭb, living under one law means unity in the direction and source from which the *ummah* derives the values and the considerations in all aspects of life.[125] As these principles cannot be implied by the modern term "nation," interpreting the Qur'ānic term *ummah* as "nation" is not appropriate. To Quṭb, the application of the term *ummah* to denote a secular nation is incorrect.[126]

Therefore, secular nationalists, according to Quṭb, should not use the term *ummah* because the *ummah* cannot exist on a secular basis. The Islamic creed is the only social bond that ties the language, history and others to form the *ummah*.[127] This implies that the use of the term *ummah* to refer to the Arab nations (*al-ummah al-ʿArabiyyah*) is not appropriate. This expression does not mention the term Islam. If the term Islam were mentioned, the Arabs would be part of the nation of Islam.

Concluding Remarks

In his writings of the early 1950s and 60s, Quṭb connects nationalism to Islam. This type of nationalism is not the one in current English usage. To him, nationalism is a creed that is Islam. He also calls for "Islamic patriotism." He provides Arabic language after Islam as "Islamic language" and emphasizes the need for further studies concerning this matter. He emphasizes that there is no enmity between Arabism and Islamic patriotism if there is a better understanding that Arabism and Islam are not separable. The Arabic language is the pulse of the Arabs and Islam. Quṭb's ideological position places responsibility onto Arabs to carry their responsibility towards one Muslim nation, not nations. All other Muslim communities are the Arab's partners.

In this sense, Quṭb's position is similar to that of Muḥammad ʿAbduh and al-Banna.

The term *ummah* is an Islamic term of Islamic particular. Therefore, the application of the term *ummah* to denote secular nationalism such as Arab nation (*al-ummah al-ʿArabiyyah*), or Arab nationalism (*al-qawmiyyah al-ʿArabiyyah*) is not appropriate. For Quṭb, secular nationalism is simply *jahiliyyah*.

Endnotes

1.   Ibrahim Abu-Rabiʿ, (1996), *Intellectual Origins of Islamic Resurgence in the Modern Arab World.* State University of New York Press, Albany, 56.

2.   *Ibid.,* 57.

3.   For comprehensive analysis of Quṭb's thought, see *ibid.*; Shepard E. William (1996), *Sayyid Quṭb and Islamic Activism, A Translation and Critical Analysis of Social Justice in Islam.* E. J. Brill, Leiden, Introduction pp. ix–lix; Shepard E. William, "Islam as a System in the Later Writings of Sayyid Quṭb," *Middle Eastern Studies,* 25/1 (January 1989): 31–50; Shepard E. William, "Al-tatawwur al-fikri li-Sayyid Quṭb: min adib ʿalmani ila radicali islami," translated by Fatimah Taymjurdin, *al-Afaq* (Morocco: al-Rabat), 1993, no. 2–3 (53–54), 219–233; Khatab, Sayed, "Al-Hudaybi's Influence on the Development of Islamist Movements in Egypt," *The Muslim World,* 91/3&4 (fall 2001): 451–479. Khatab, Sayed, "Hakimiyyah and Jahiliyyah in the Thought of Sayyid Quṭb," *Middle Eastern Studies,* 38/3 (July 2002): 145–170; Khatab, Sayed, "Citizenship Rights of Non-Muslims in the Islamic State of Hakimiyyah Espoused by Sayyid Quṭb," *Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations,* 13/2 (April 2002): 163–187.

4.   For further details, see Ibrahim Abu-Rabiʿ, (1996), *Intellectual Origins of Islamic Resurgence in the Modern Arab World,* 37, 53–61, *esp.* 56; also see Haykal, Muḥammad Hasanayn, "Nahnu Nasiru bi-Surʿah Mudhhilah Wa-lakin La-Naʿrif ila Ayn: We are Running with Astonishing Speed, but We do not Know our Destination," *Rose el-Youssef,* Feb. 14 (1994), n. 3427, 42.

5.   In "Islam and Ideology: Towards a Typology," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 19 (1987): 307–336, William E. Shepard substituted 'Islamic fundamentalism' with the term 'Islamic radicalism'. He also used 'radical Islamism' as a term labeling the ideas and the thinking of those 'Islamic radicals' of whom Sayyid Quṭb is one "who manifest certain sorts of modern tendencies of which the idea of Islam as system" and nationalistic (*qawmi*) "is one". Also, see Shepard E. William, "Islam as a System in the Later Writings of Sayyid Quṭb", *Middle Eastern Studies,* 25/1 (January 1989): 31–50, *esp.* 31.

6.   For further details on the lexical origins of the term *fitrah,* see Ibn Manzur (1994), *Lisan al-Arab,* vol. 5, 56, 58–59; Lane (1972), *Arabic-English Lexicon,* Book 1, part 2, 397; al-Qurtubi (1985), *al-Jamiʿ,* vol. 14, 27; al-Isfahani al-Raghib, *Muʿjam Mufradat Alfaz al-Qurʾān* (1984), Nadim Marʿashli (ed.). Beirut: Dar al-Kitab al-Arabi, 2415. The idea of *fitrah* is significant in Quṭb's thought and calls for further research on the topic.

7.   See, Quṭb, *Fi Zilal al-Qurʾān,* Cairo: al-Shuruq (1992), vol. 6, 3933, 3966; vol. 5, 3027; *Khasaʾis al-Tasawwur al-Islami,* Cairo: al-Shuruq (1995), 79; al-Qurtubi, Abdullah, *al-Jamiʿ li-Ahkam al-Qurʾān,* Beirut: Ihya al-Turath al-Arabi (1985), vol. 14, 24–31; vol. 18, 133; Ibn Taymiyyah, Taqiyy al-Din, *al-ʿUbudiyyah,* Beirut: al-Kitab al-Arabi (1987), 70; al-ʿAsqalani, al-Hafiz Ibn Hajar, *Fath al-Bari,* Cairo: al-Bayan (1987), vol. 13, 520; ʿAbduh, Muḥammad, *Tafsir al-Manar,* Cairo: al-Hayʿah al-Misriyyah al-ʿammah li al-Kitab (1972), vol. 1, 218.

8.   Quṭb (1990), *Hadha al-Din*, 20–21; also see Ibn Manzur (1994), *Lisan al-'Arab*, vol. 3, 270; see Ibn Kathir (1994), *Tafsir*, vol. 2, 479; al-Qurtubi (1985), *al-Jami'*, vol. 9, 129; vol. 13, 210.

9.   I have dealt with Hakimiyyah in details, see Khatab, Sayed, "Hakimiyyah and Jahiliyyah in the Thought of Sayyid Quṭb," *Middle Eastern Studies*, 38/3 (July 2002): 145–170.

10.   Quṭb (1993), *Ma'alim fi al-Tariq*, Cairo: al-Shuruq, 110–113; *al-Islam wa Mushkilat al-Hadarah*, Cairo: al-Shuruq (1983), 24–6.

11.   Quṭb, *Zilal*, vol. 1, 291; *Mushkilat Hadarah*, 122–125; *Islam: The Religion*, 34–58.

12.   Quṭb, *Ma'alim*, 149, 151–57; *Zilal*, vol. 6, 3933–66; vol. 5, 3027–29; *Khasa'is*, 79–80.

13.   *Ibid.*, 152, 156–58.

14.   *Ibid.*, 149–61.

15.   Quṭb, *Khasa'is*, 91–92; for the quotation, Quṭb refers to Muḥammad Asad's book *Islam at the Crossroads*, trans. into Arabic by 'Umar Farrukh, 109–112; also see Asad, Muḥammad. *Islam at the Crossroads*. Lahore: Ashraf Publication (1955), 150–155.

16.   World Book Dictionary, 1383 *esp.* nationalism.

17.   Quṭb uses the term *jahiliyyah*, not to refer to a specific period, place or race, but to indicate the opposite condition to Islam, see Quṭb, *al-Adalah al-Ijtima'iyyah fi al-Islam*, Cairo: al-Shuruq (1993), 186–87, 187–8; see the English translation of the first edition, Kotb, Sayed, *Social Justice in Islam*, trans. John B. Hardie, Washington, American Council of Learned Societies (1953), 236, 237–8; See Shepard, William, *Sayyid Quṭb and Islamic Activism: A Translation and Critical Analysis of Social Justice in Islam*, E.J. Brill, Leiden (1996), 283–84 paragraph 65–66, 284–5, paragraph 68; see Quṭb, *Zilal*, vol. 1, 342.

18.   See, al-Khalidi, Salah (1994), *Sayyid Quṭb*, 541–2.

19.   See 'Abd al-Baqi (1986), *Sayyid Quṭb*, 435–438; al-Khabbas, Abdullah (1983), *Sayyid Quṭb*, 396–398.

20.   Quṭb, (1993), *Mujtama'*, 96–7.

21.   Quṭb, (1993), *Ra'smaliyyah*, 59.

22.   *Ibid.*, 61.

23.   Translation of the word *ummah* with by the word nation is accurate in dictionary terms. But the word nation does not fit Quṭb's thinking of the word *ummah*, unless the meaning of the word nation means "a group of people bound together by Islamic belief." Quṭb (1992), *Zilal*, vol. 3, 1445 fn. 1.

24.   Quṭb, (1995), *Hadha al-Din*, 88.

25.   Quṭb, (1993), *Ma'alim*, 151.

26.   *Ibid.*, 159; for further details on Quṭb's view of nationalism in connection to Islam, see, *Zilal*, vol. 1, 512; vol. 4, 2115; *Nahwa Mujtama' Islami*, 92.

27.   al-'Ashmawi, Muḥammad Saeed, "Thawrat Yulyu Ammamat al-Din" (The Revolution of July Nationalized the Religion), *Sabah al-Kheir*, Thursday, 19 April (1990), n. 1789, 8–10, *esp.* 10.

28.   Ibn Manzur, *Lisan*, vol. 12, 499–504.

29.   Shahrur, Muḥammad, (1990), *al-Kitab wa al-Qur'ān*, 575, see p. 578.

30.   See, Abu Rabi', M. Ibrahim (1996), *Intellectual Origins of Islamic Resurgence*, 56–60; Pennock J. Roland, (1979), *Democratic Political theory*, 246–252; Dunn, John, (1979), *Western Political Theory in the Face of the Future*, 57, see 55–80; Ayubi, Nazih (1991), *Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Arab World*. London and New York, 53–54, 122–3, 128–9, 222–3.

31.   Al-Bazzaz, 'Abd al-Rahman (1962), "Islam and Arab Nationalism," in Silvia G. Haim (ed.), *Arab Nationalism* Berkeley: University of California Press, 172–76, 178–88.

32.   Quṭb, *Ma'alim*, pp. 149–161, 165; *Zilal*, vol. 1, 200, 421, 414, 512.

33.   Quṭb, *Zilal*, vol. 1, 200, 414, 421, 510–512.

34.   *Ibid.*, vol. 3, 1305; vol. 4, 1891–1892, 2370.

35.   *Ibid.*, vol. 1, 510–512; for similar views, see *Ma'alim*, 151, 156–61.

36.   *Ibid.*, vol. 4, p. 1888, also see 1889 for more details.

37.   Al-Kilani (1995), *al-Harakat al-Islamiyyah*, 88–89.

38.   Quṭb, *Zilal*, vol. 1, 126.

39.   Pennock J. Roland, (1979), *Democratic Political Theory*, 57, 59, see 55–78.

40.   Farah, (1957), *The Impact of the West on the Conflict of Ideologies in the Arab World*, 310–334.

41.   Quṭb, *Zilal*, vol. 1, 414–15; also see 'Abduh, (1972), *Tafsir*, vol. 1, 12.

42.   *Ibid.*, 511; *Ma'lim*, 21, 162, 163.

43.   On January eighth 1992, a debate between Islamists and nationalists was held in Cairo. Muḥammad 'Umarah, al-Ghazali and Ma'mun al-Hudaybi represented the Islamic side. On the other side were Farag Fudah and Muḥammad Khalafallah. Speeches were then collected in al-Sawi, Muḥammad Salah, (1992), *al-Muwajabah Bayna al-Islam wa al-'Ilmaniyyah (Face to Face between Islam and Secularism)*, Cairo, see 62–70, 142–148; also see Fodah, Farg, (1988), *al-Haqiqah al-Gha'ibah (The Missing Truth)*, Cairo, 34–44, 76–78; 'Ashmawi, Muḥammad Saeed, (1987), *al-Islam al-Siyasi (Political Islam)*, Cairo, 149–160; also for an earlier Islamic view of nationalism, see 'Abduh, Muḥammad (1972), *Tafsir al Manar*, vol. 1, 11; compare Abduh with Quṭb, *Ma'alim*, 108–15.

44.   Al-Dawalibi, "Islam and Nationalistic and Secularistic Trends," In Kharofa, Ala'Eddin (ed.), *Nationalism, Secularism, Apostasy and Uuruy in Islam* (Noordeen: Kuala Lumpur, 1994), 5–6.

45.   Maspero Gaston, *The Dawn of Civilization* (1910), 36–50; also see, Petrie Felinders, *History of Egypt*, (1899), vol. 1, 12–14.

46.   Quṭb , *Zilal*, vol. 2, 673; see vol. 1, 512–515; vol. 2, 686, 1006; vol. 3, 305; vol. 4, 1891, 2459;

47.   *Ibid.*, 673.

48.   'Abduh, *Tafsir al-Manar*, vol. 1, 25.

49.   Quṭb, *Zilal*, vol. 5, 2584 *esp.* comments on verse (26:2); also see vol. 4, 1851 *esp.* comments on verse (11:1); vol. 3, 1759 *esp.* comments on verse (10:1).

50.   *Ibid.*, vol. 4, 2087.

51.   'Abduh, *Tafsir al-Manar*, vol. 1, 25.

52.   Quṭb, *Zilal*, vol. 2, 685–686.

53.   Quṭb, *Zilal*, vol. 5, 2617, vol. 3, 1562 *esp.* open society for 'the Egyptian, the Persian . . .'

54.   World Book Dictionary, 1217, *esp.* lingua franca.

55.   Abu-Rabi', Ibrahim (1996), *Intellectual Origins of Islamic Resurgence in the Modern Arab World.* State University of New York Press, Albany, 43.

56.   'Abduh, *Tafsir al-Manar*, vol. 1, 24.

57.   Quṭb, *Zilal*, vol. 2, 673.

58.   Ibn Khaldun, *Muqaddimah*. Beirut: al-A'lami, n.d., vol. 1, 543, see 544; also see 'Abduh, *Tafsir al-Manar*, vol. 1, 24.

59.   Ibn 'Asakir, *Kanz al-'Ummal*, vol. 12, 47.

60.   Quṭb, *Zilal*, vol. 2, 673.

61. See Ibn Khaldun, *Muqaddimah*. Beirut: al-A'lami, n.d., 543–555; Quṭb wrote an article entitled "*The Arabic Language in the Muslim World*," *al-Risalah* (1951), n. 965, 1469–1471, but I have not had the opportunity to see it.

62. 'Abduh, Muḥammad (1972), *Tafsir al Manar*, vol. 1, 11.

63. Al-Bayyumi, Muḥammad Rajab, 'al-Imam al-Akbar 'Abd al-Rahman Tajj', *Majallat al-Azhar*, November (1994), vol. 67, part 6, 781–786, *cf.* 785.

64. Quṭb, *Zilal*, vol. 4, 1891.

65. Quṭb, *Ma'alim*, 10, 151.

66. The *qiblah* is the direction to which Muslims turn in prayer.

67. Quṭb, *Zilal*, vol. 1, 134; see vol. 1, 344, 412, 442; vol. 2, 1005–1006, 1126.

68. Quṭb, *Ma'alim*, 151–52.

69. Al-'Ashmawi, (1987), *al-Islam al-Siyasi*, see Chapter al-Qawmiyyah al-Islamiyyah, 149–1701; Fudah, Farag (1988), *al-Haqiqah al-Gha'ibah*, 17–18, 119.

70. Quṭb, *Ma'alim*, 151–52.

71. See al-Tabari, (1997), *Tarikh*, vol. 1, 540–545; Ibn Hisham, (1995), *al-Sirah*, vol. 1, 303, see, 299–304; Balyuzi, H. M. (1976), *Muhammad and the Course of Islam*. Oxford: George Ronald, 32–52; Watt, Montgomery (1960), *Muḥammad: Prophet and Statesman*. Oxford University Press, 55–78.

72. For the speech of the Prophet, see Numani, Shibli, *Sirat-Un-Nabi (The Life of the Prophet)*, Delhi: Adam Publishers (1998), vol. 1, 179–180; see Ibn Hisham, (1995), *al-Sirah*, vol. 1, 303, see, 299–304.

73. Al-Tabari, *Tarikh*, vol. 2, 22–23.

74. *Ibid.*, 152–155.

75. Quṭb, *Zilal*, vol. 2, 1005–7; see also 1126; vol. 3, 1562.

76. *Ibid.*, vol. 3, 1562; vol. 4, 1885–1888.

77. Rif'at M. (1947), *The Awakening of Modern Egypt*, 12.

78. Ansari, Nasser, (1987), *Mawsu'at Hukkam Misr*, 24.

79. The capital city was called the "White Castle," later called "Memph" and then "Memphis" which is until this day known by these names situated about 50 km from the modern capital city Cairo; for further details see Jacq (1989), *Ramses*, 5 valiums, see vol. 2, 6; Ansari, *Hukkam Misr*, 24.

80. Quṭb (1993), *Mashahid al-Qiyamah*, p. 15, see 14–21.

81. Ansari, Nasser, *Mawsu'at Hukkam Misr*, 22–38, for flags (national flage, the flage of the police of the capital city, the flage of the navy . . . etc) see 217, for the national anthem, see 148–149, for the official stamp and sign, see 183–196.

82. Present-day Turkey.

83. Jacq, Christian (1996), *Ramses*, vol. 3, 8.

84. Tomlin, (1858), *Great Philosophers*, 44–45.

85. Husayn, Muḥammad (1985), *Islam wa al-Hadarah al-Gharbiyyah*, 20–24.

86. Haykal, Muḥammad Hasanayn, "Nahnu Nasiru bi-Sur'ah Mudhhilah." *Rose el-Youssef*, Feb. 14 (1994), n. 3427, 42; Tahtawi (d.1873), Taha Husayn (d.1973), Tawfiq al-Hakim (d.1989), Husayn Haykal (d.1953) and al-Aqqad (d.1954) all were literary critics received Western education. Tahtawi was sent by Muḥammad 'Ali (ruled Egypt from 1805–1848 and died in 1849) to study in France. Tahtawi lived in Paris five years (1826–1831), influenced by Western civilization. After his return, Tahtawi led the westernization in Egypt. See Husayn, Muḥammad (1985), *Islam wa al-Hadarah al-Gharbiyyah*, 18–30, 66.

87. Salt, Jeremy, "Strategies of Islamic Revivalism in Egypt," *Journal of Arab, Islamic and Middle East Studies*, vol. 1: 2 (1994), 91.

88.   Al-Liwa' [Jordanian Journal], 10 September (1986), n. 696 cited in al-Hilal [Egyptian Journal], September 1986; and mentioned by Hanafi, Hasan, "al-Jama'at al-Islamiyyah la Tuwajih al-Aqabat," *ose el-Youssef*, 16 April (1990), n. 3227, 32.

89.   Al-Khalidi, *Sayyid Quṭb*, 299.

90.   World Book Enc., vol. 13, 614.

91.   Hanafi, Hasan, (1989), *al-Harakat al-Islamiyyah fi Misr*, 45.

92.   Quṭb, *Dirasat Islamiyyah*, 163–64.

93.   Al-Husari is a leading figure of Arab Nationalism. For more about him and his debate with Taha Husayn, see al-Kilani, Sami (1973), *With Taha Husayn*, Cairo: Dar al-Ma'arif, 122–23. As for Sa'adah, he is the founder of the Syrian Nationalist Party. *cf.* Quṭb, *Dirasat*, 166 fn. 1.

94.   'Asim, Muhammad, "Mushkilatina fi Daw' al-Islam." In Quṭb, *Dirasat Islamiyyah*, 165–67.

95.   Quṭb, *Dirasat Islamiyyah*, 168.

96.   *Ibid.*, 164.

97.   For further details about the relationship between Quṭb and the Revolutionary Council, see my article "al-Hudaybi's Influence on the Development of Islamist Movement in Egypt," *The Muslim World*, vol. 91, n. 3 & 4 (Fall 2001): 451–479; also see Mahmud Nasr, "Fu'ad 'Allam Yftah Dhakiratahu 'ala al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun", *Uktuber*, n. 1030 (July 31, 1996): 44–45.

98.   Quṭb, *Zilal*, vol. 1, 126, see 127–29; also see *Limadha A'damoni*, 91–94.

99.   *Ibid.*, 129.

100.   *Ibid.*, vol. 1, 113.

101.   Quṭb, (1993), *Ma'alim*, 149–150.

102.   Quṭb, *Dirasat Islamiyyah*, 163–64.

103.   'Abduh, Muhammad (1972), *Tafsir al Manar*, vol. 1, 11.

104.   *Ibid.*, 6.

105.   *Ibid.*, 25.

106.   Al-Banna, *Rasa'il*, 141–44.

107.   Quṭb, *Zilal*, vol. 4, 2370.

108.   For Quṭb's view about the existence of the *ummah* and the existence of Islam, see further detail in chapter 5.1 under the subtitle Hakimiyyah and the existence of Islam.

109.   Quṭb, *Zilal*, vol. 1, 512.

110.   Quṭb, *Dirasat Islamiyyah*, 163–64.

111.   Abu Rabi', Ibrahim (1996), *Intellectual Origins of Islamic Resurgence in the Modern Arab World*. State University of New York Press, Albany, 21–22; For similar view, see Quṭb, *al-Adalah al-Ijtima'iyyah fi Islam*, Cairo: al-Shuruq (9th edition 1983) Chapter (Hadir al-Islam wa Mustaqbalih: The Present and Future of Islam, *esp.* 184, 186, 187 and ff., 188–213. For the English translation of Quṭb's book see Shepard E. William (1996), *Sayyid Quṭb and Islamic Activism, A Translation and Critical Analysis of Social Justice in Islam*. E. J. Brill, Leiden, Chapter 8 *esp.* 280–81, 283 and ff., 284–348.

112.   Qur'ān, 6:38; 10:19, 47; 11:8; 12:2; 13:30; 16:93, 120; 21:92; 43:22–23.

113.   Asad, Muhammad, (1980), *The Message of the Qur'ān*, 177.

114.   Michael Cook devoted a book of 661 pages of large size and small print to provide a comprehensive coverage and a full monographic treatment of "commanding right and forbidding wrong." Speaking of this duty in civilizations other than Islam, Michael Cook writes "we have a clear conception that we have some kind of duty not just to behave decently ourselves, but to prevent others from doing things to their fellow humans which are outrageously wrong. Yet in everyday life we lack a name for the duty, still less a general

formulation of the situations to which it applies and the circumstances that dispense us from it. The value is there, but it is not one that our culture has developed and systematized . . . Islam, by contrast, provides both a name and a doctrine for a broad moral duty of this kind." Cook, Michael, *Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong in Islamic Thought*. Cambridge University Press, first edition (2000), xi.

115. See Qur'ān 2:230; 11:89; 12:87; 27:55. For further details see Ibn Manzur, *Lisan al-Arab*, vol. 12, 505–506.

116. Watt, Montgomery, "Ideal Factors in the origin of Islam." *The Islamic Quarterly*, II, No. 3 (October, 1955), 161–74.

117. Nazih, Ayubi (1991), *Political Islam*, 3.

118. Ibn Hisham, *al-Sirah*, vol. 2, 115–18.

119. Qutb, *Zilal*, vol. 1, 126, 129, 134, 344, 412, 442, 512; vol. 2, 686, 1005–6, 1126; vol. 3, 1305, 1562–3; vol. 4, 1885–88, 1891–92, 2370; vol. 6, 3515; *Nahwa Mujtama' Islami*, 18–23.

120. Qur'ān, 43:22–23.

121. Qutb, *Zilal*, vol. 4, 1890–92.

122. Qutb, *Ma'alim*, 149.

123. *Ibid.*, 150.

124. Qutb, *Nahwa Mujtama' Islami*, 21; *Zilal*, vol. 4, 2101; vol. 6, 3515; *Ma'alim*, 149.

125. Qutb, *Zilal*, vol. 4, 1885–88.

126. Qutb, *Ma'alim*, 29–30; *Hadha al-Din*, 85–7.

127. Qutb, *Hadha al-Din*, 87.